The Greece is a small region with little more than 11 million inhabitants.
Nevertheless the ' € is under attack, i mercati finanziari impazziscono e l’ Ue e il Fmi devono intervenire pesantemente per evitare un nuovo e imponente tracollo finanziario globale.
In verità la Grecia non è il “problema” finanziario dell’Europa e del pianeta, come non lo fu la Lehman Brothers , prodromo iniziale strategico all’attuale crisi in atto, non assimilabile neppure lontanamente ai blandi effetti negativi finanziari creati dagli attacchi alle Torri gemelle l’11 Settembre.
Un capitolo a parte andrebbe riservato alle agenzie di rating che emettono reviews often reckless ... as well as surface species, almost always, to open markets.
Suffice it to say that, for example, Parmalat and the same Lehman Brothers were considered up to 24 h before the collapse, these same companies, by AAA: the best we could find on the market!
Now the Greek titles are declared junk the Portugal (another small country) and downgraded the Spain same offending.
The situation is dramatic locally, but it should be for the entire planet.
Speculation intensifies the financial markets, relying on hysteria that savers have confidence in the future.
Those who follow the trading can not fail to have noticed that when the fall pounced on securities, the bid to reach huge numbers, even if the actual treatment of those attached to lower prices, at a minimum, a cent of volume.
The titles of the various countries are usually concluded for more than half by foreign entities, just as largely del debito americano è sottoscritto dalla Cina. E ciò vale anche per l’Italia.
Il debito americano è il vero pericolo all’economia globale per le grandi dimensioni che ha assunto, non tanto nel pubblico, quanto nel privato. La somma di pubblico e privato raggiunge una montagna troppo alta da … scalare; e, in misura minore, il discorso vale anche per l’Inghilterra.
Eppure vengono considerati, a torto, paesi affidabili!
Se la speculazione dovesse colpire i titoli di stato degli States, come lo è per la Grecia ora, non credo che vi potrebbe essere alcun rimedio.
However, this does not happen for one simple reason: the collapse of the U.S. would be traumatic for everyone, including the same speculators that would go to hell as the whole economy of the planet. These financial figures are too large for anyone.
The risk would not be worth the candle.
therefore, to speculate, it is much better "condition " the market for small.
Argentina has partly overcome the previous default, but by analyzing the accounts, does not seem to have drawn lessons from the past have the necessary rigor.
policy, therefore, strongly called on the field with its social and strategic choices.
It also becomes possible for the Greek case, since, at the EU level, have lost important months to avoid excessive waste of money Community trooped between personality and national self-interest that now cost much more.
An example?
Until about a month ago, Greece was in need of some of € 22 billion, now 45 immediate to get to the end of the year and then an equal number to each of the next two years, hoping that this huge money is sufficient to allay the distrust of the market.
If this huge sum was given to Lombardy, in almost the same population, swimming ... all gold as the duck Disney.
Translated into hard cash, the Trilussa, the cost attributable to each Italian citizen to support Greece, because the '€ itself, will be about just under € 300 in total three-year period, in line with the cost any other European citizen.
Therefore, if the system jumps (l '€), will be great pain for all, especially for those who, like the nations to the south, more debt, less reserves and energy to enter the market. Not for nothing the resistance, even if politically implausible, Germany is understandable.
markets without regulation and restrictive legislation today do what they want, based solely on the mercy of those companies that, by failing and failing, they can enter markets astronomical even in a single day.
In years past I have always been reluctant to EU policy formation, with well written and reasoned action. So much to be branded by some as superficialoni "Eurosceptic".
My opposition was based not on the union itself but to the implementation method, too simplistic and without specific constraints, that they did become one body and not just a political and social amorphous agglomeration, as in effect , it is now.
Italy policy is implemented in 1870 with the capture of Rome, the social reality, many decades later, is far more of the future.
Therefore let alone Europe, structurally divided between the countries of North and South not only operationally, structurally, just as our logistics Italy is divided between north and south, a north to Anglo-Saxon mentality, a southern Latin .
The German Finance is the one that called the march to Merkel binding on the choices.
There are many signs that presage growing irritation to stay in the EU in general and in the '€ in particular, because it includes additional costs che non sono compensati in toto da benefici.
Basti ricordare che la Germania dovrà addossarsi l’onere maggiore del sostegno alla Grecia: il 60% in più circa di quanto costerà all’Italia.
Vi sono già ipotesi più che realistiche a svincolare subito la Germania dall’€ in caso di default di alcuni paesi, dividendo di fatto l’Ue in due diverse entità:
a) la prima, anglosassone, ancorata alla Germania con i vari paesi satelliti viciniori, e con la possibile aggiunta della Francia;
b) the second Latin American, anchored to Italy with all the Latin countries and the Mediterranean. In this deplorable (although in my view, only political fiction) when Italy suffered from splitting in two, with the north which would be to the north by Germany, leaving the south and center to their fate.
is why we have lost too much time to save Greece, then in order to prevent other countries that were under attack PIIGS area of \u200b\u200bspeculation.
Just like the case of Lehman Brothers has evidenziato sui mercati internazionali.
Tra nord e sud Europa vi è la differenza somatica propria della diversità insita tra l’individuo che fa sistema e lo statalismo che fa assistenzialismo. Come avviene, in sintesi ridotta, anche in Italia tra il Nord e il Sud.
A sommi capi non per nulla il nord è a maggioranza di matrice religiosa protestante, perciò laica, mentre il sud è cattolico, perciò confessionale. Diversità ideologiche che portano con sé altro: il pragmatismo operativo da una parte e la pretesa del diritto acquisito dall’altra.
Greece's bluff on its first day, then said he would accept on his terms ... and now that no aid will be a catastrophe. A strange way, so to speak, to move: pull the rope until you're broke.
is one of several major industrial productivity between North and South, identified the same situation in Italian.
Not for nothing, in Italy, the Lega Nord has arisen, where people are "fed up " have to keep the South forever.
And this same idea pervades the vast majority of Germans who wonder why, after paying to boost poor countries of the EU, now also have to pay to keep the pensions they receive no gold essersele earned.
You can talk so selfish, but self-interest that arises from the strategic mistakes of policy: those of a merger that should not happen in any condition and without any supranational amalgam.
The enlargement of the EU has worsened the situation and increased costs, favoring only the multinationals that have been able to roam undisturbed where profit could be higher, thereby impoverishing the structural system of individual production in advanced countries.
A counterpart, the loan of solidarity with Greece puts Germany as the largest recipient of 5.5% in profit on the interest that Greece will pay, this having the option of placing on the market their titles (to finance the rescue greek) to lower rates, so a gap larger than any other income.
Italy, for example, pays 1 / 4 to point more to raise the necessary capital, as its much larger debt.
The same applies to the depreciation of similar '€, act to promote German exports.
The problem is not profitability, but the ability of the lender to repay the capital and when the lender.
The solvency is calculated not on the gross domestic product, but the profit that can potentially generate the same GDP, and the weight of the interest, which creates the debt, is a relentless devourer of GDP.
€ 135 billion in total, sempre che bastino, sono una cifra colossale che difficilmente la Grecia sarà in grado di restituire tra 10 anni, specie se a questi interessi si debbano aggiungere gli altri del debito pubblico già sul mercato, a tassi decisamente superiori.
I salari nel nord Europa sono maggiori che al sud, anche se la vita costa potenzialmente di più.
Questa differenza salariale è dovuta non solo alla produttività, ma, soprattutto, alla capacità tecnologica di saper immettere sul mercato prodotti ad alto contenuto tecnologico, dove il guadagno può essere maggiore per carenza di concorrenza. E la Grecia, come molti altri paesi latini, scarseggia in profitability and innovative production.
argue that now that the EU has done, even if only in a germ, the process can not be stopped, but to be corrected and enhanced to create an amalgam that production and a new supranational cohesion great country.
To achieve this we must quickly correct the distortions policies that exist between the various nations participating, placed under a central political and economic rigor species on public budgets.
will do so, even with gli aiuti, verso il default strutturale di alcuni paesi, creando, di fatto, la disgregazione dell’unione stessa.
L’unione e la fusione devono essere velocemente incrementata in una centralità decisionale, pure nel rispetto delle varie esigenze nazionali.
L’ipotesi di una Finanza tedesca che si prepari a lasciare l’Ue e l’€, per salvare il salvabile nel peggiore dei casi, non è troppo irrealistica se si procederà sulla falsariga di quanto fatto finora. È un fatto pragmatico di un’ipotesi eventuale e non remota.
L’indecisione politica della Merkel, on the Greek case, was in bankruptcy from all points of view: hysteria of the financial markets, increase the cost of, capital losses on equity, accelerating economic collapse greek, weakening the EU's political and distrust of citizens on the future .
However, it is understandable if you look at German public opinion, to which Merkel will have to give justification to the next election.
The May 1 was once the party of workers and now is working.
Un lavoro lungo e incessante che aspetta la politica, per correggere velocemente gli errori strategici di un’Unione che doveva essere più selettiva ed omogenea.
Per uscire dalla crisi finanziaria, che può coinvolgere i paesi P.I.I.G.S. e disgregare l’Ue, non sarà sufficiente il solo mese di maggio: servirà un maggio molto lungo, dove le mosse politiche e finanziarie non potranno essere procrastinate e sbagliate, comprese quelle immediate.
Pure i cittadini dell’Unione sono attesi ad un lungo maggio, non solo di lavoro, ma pure di austerità e di sacrifici per ridurre public debt that the management of public finances happy in the past decades has created.
And what if you do not want to have a future far worse than the current and traumatic for everyone, especially for the poor.
0 comments:
Post a Comment